THE BACKGROUND OF REMOTE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM FOR NPPS
In Japan, periodic inspection for NPPs is obliged every 13 months by Article 54 of the Electricity Utilities Industry Law, though periodic inspection for thermal power plants is done spontaneously. Overhaul of nuclear reactor vessels, fuel tests, eddy current tests of steam generators on heat transfer tubes, overhaul of turbines, checking valves and pumps, leakage tests of primary coolant systems, and total load performance tests are conducted at each periodic inspection of NPPs. Currently it takes about 40 days in shorter cases and more than 100 days in longer cases to inspect them. The electric companies must stop generation of electricity during the inspections. Therefore, reducing periodic inspection time is desired to raise the rate of operation.
Some effort has been made to reduce periodic inspection time by surveying plants remotely and through collaborations between on-site operators and remote plant designers and expert operators. If we can operate control boards remotely at periodic inspection, we can omit most operations in power plants and reduce the periodic inspection time.
Dedicated communication lines have been used for remote maintenance because of security and cost.
However, with the spread of Internet protection technologies such as Firewall and IDS (Intrusion Detection System), which have access control functions, and VPN (Virtual Private Network), which has data encryption functions, remote maintenance systems with Internet technologies have entered our range of choices.
However, Internet technology is not completely trusted yet. The OCIPEP (Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness) in Canada reported in 2001 that they found some indications that the terrorist organization Al Qaeda was aiming SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisitions) systems at critical infrastructures such as chemical, oil, transportation, electric and water industries [4] . Threats of cyber-terrorism aimed at large-scale plants has increased recently.
Furthermore, if we assume that operations by remote maintenance are not limited, a malicious operator who knows the systems well might damage an NPP badly. However, control boards generally have fail-safe functions, and it is actually impossible to cause a severe problem by remote operations.
It is believed that NPPs always have threats of radioactive leaks. If security is violated by a failure of remote maintenance, it could possibly cause anxiety that radioactivity safety has also been compromised. Abstract: As a method to reduce periodic inspection time and mean recovery time on fault occurrence, remote maintenance systems for nuclear power plants (NPPs) are proposed, which augment efficiencies in maintenance operations for the plants by surveying them remotely and achieving collaborations between on-site operators and remote plant designers and expert operators [1] . In particular, with the spread of Internet technology and Internet security protection technology in recent years, there is a tendency to build remote maintenance systems using the Internet without dedicated communication lines [2] . However, the biggest concern of customers such as electric power companies is security. It is highly necessary to give assurance of the security of remote maintenance systems coherently and consistently in order to introduce such systems based on Internet technology into NPPs. However, there exist various ways of thinking about security. Furthermore, there has not been a general agreement on how to give assurance of the security of remote maintenance systems for NPPs.
So we have applied ISO/IEC 15408 [3] to remote maintenance systems for NPPs. It is used to evaluate the security level of IT products and systems. Based on ISO/IEC 15408, we have listed assets to be protected, threats to the assets, security objectives against the threats, and security functional requirements that achieve the security objectives. Also, we have shown relations between the threats and the security objectives, and relations between the security objectives and the security functional requirements. As a result, we have concretized a necessary and sufficient security design of remote maintenance systems for NPPs that can protect the instrumentation and control (I&C) system against intrusion, impersonation, tapping, obstruction and destruction.
In this paper, we describe the background of the remote maintenance systems for NPPs, a summary of the systems, and its security design based on ISO/IEC 15408.
Keywords: Instrumentation and Control System, Remote Maintenance System, Nuclear Power Plants, ISO/IEC 15408, Security Target, Protection Profile Therefore, electric power companies are disinclined to introduce remote maintenance systems. It is highly necessary to demonstrate assurance of the security of remote maintenance systems coherently and consistently in order to introduce systems based on Internet technology into NPPs. However, there exist various ways of thinking about security. Furthermore, there has not been any general agreement on how to give assurance of the security of remote maintenance systems for NPPs. So we have applied ISO/IEC -evaluation criteria for IT security-to remote maintenance systems for NPPs.
ISO/IEC 15408 is a standard of formats and terms by which we declare that IT products and systems ensure security. ISO/IEC 15408 provides ways to make security documents, which are used with IT products and systems to evaluate security. In ISO/IEC 15408, assurance of security means that security documents are valid, and that products and systems are based on the security documents.
We have made security documents for a remote maintenance system for NPPs. In this paper, we demonstrate the points in the process of making the security documents.
SUMMARY OF REMOTE MAINTENANCE
SYSTEM FOR NPPS Figure 1 shows the security design of a remote maintenance system for NPPs. The target of evaluation (TOE) in ISO/IEC 15408 consists of a Biometric Access Device, Client for Remote Maintenance, Firewall and Encryption Device, which are located in the Maintenance Center, and an Encryption Device, Firewall, Industrial IDS and Server for Remote Maintenance, which are located in the power plant. 
Industrial IDS is an IDS specialized for monitoring and controlling plants. The Firewall surveys the source and destination IP addresses and port numbers, while the IDS surveys the details of remote maintenance operations. IDS stands for Intrusion Detection System, but the general definition of "IDS" is a device that monitors packets and controls accesses by referring signatures, which describe known patterns of intrusion and attacks.
Industrial IDS differs from normal IDS in that it monitors the status of the targets of remote operations. In the plant, the status of the control boards changes as time passes. Figure 2 illustrates the concept of the Industrial IDS. In the figure, at time A at place B, operator C executes operation E for target D. There can be a case where an operation by a client may be allowed in one situation and not in another. For example, an operation may be allowed while the control board is not tagged and may not be allowed while it is being tagged. Normal IDS controls accesses by monitoring time, place, operator, target and operation, and Industrial IDS controls accesses by the status of the targets. 
THE SECURITY DESIGN BASED ON ISO/I EC 15408
With ISO/IEC 15408, we must design the security in a designated order as follows:
(1) Decide assets to be protected (2) Extract threats to the assets (3) List security objectives against the threats (4) Select security functional requirements that achieve the security objectives (5) Draw up the specification that implements security functional requirements.
The security designers define (1) and (2), and ISO/IEC 15408 is not concerned with the validity of (1) and (2) . In ISO/IEC 15408, we must ensure the validity of (3), (4) and (5), and the validity of relations between (3) and (4), and between (4) and (5). Ensuring security coherently and consistently means ensuring these validities.
However, if we create a skeleton of the security design for some categories such as the OS and systems, we don't need (5). We outline the skeleton of remote maintenance systems for NPPs below, focusing on points (1)-(4).
To Determine Assets to be Protected
First, we must decide what are the assets to be protected. In this case, we have extracted three assets as follows:
• Stable service of control boards • Smooth operation of remote maintenance • Data sent and received between the maintenance center and the power plant.
To Extract Threats to the Assets
Second, we must extract threats to the assets. In ISO/IEC 15408, we must describe "Threat Agents," "Assets" and "How to Attack" without omission. We have defined three threat agents as follows:
• Operators who have the right accounts for the remote maintenance system • Operators who don't have the right accounts for the remote maintenance system but can enter the maintenance center • Malicious attackers
We have determined five threats as follows: • Intrusion: Malicious attackers may intrude on the client or server for remote maintenance by searching for vulnerabilities, and the stable service of the control boards may be threatened.
• Impersonation: Operators who don't have the right accounts for the remote maintenance system but can enter the maintenance center, may impersonate operators who have the right accounts for the remote maintenance system, and the stable service of control boards may be threatened.
• Tapping: Malicious attackers may tap packets on the Internet, and data sent and received between the maintenance center and the power plant may be threatened.
• Obstruction: Malicious attackers may attack client or server for remote maintenance very often, and smooth operation of remote maintenance may be threatened.
• Destruction: Operators who have the right accounts for the remote maintenance system may execute illegal operations, and the stable service of the control boards may be threatened. Except for the five threats above, the threats that the remote maintenance system for NPPs is not concerned with are treated as assumptions. For example, we will treat "malicious attackers don't enter the power plant", "each machine is protected against such things as viruses and spyware" and so on as assumptions.
To List Security Objectives against the Threats
We have listed six security objectives against the threats as follows:
• Limitation of Communications: TOE must block communications that come under specific patterns and may violate the security of TOE.
• Right Identification, Authentication and Role:
TOE must identify and authenticate operators correctly, and operators who are identified and authenticated must be related with the roles that are defined by their organization.
• Data Encryption: TOE must encrypt data that are forwarded to the Internet.
• Prevention of DoS (Denial of Service): TOE must prevent malfunctions when TOE is operated very often.
• Protection from Operations not Allowed: TOE must protect itself from operations that are not allowed for assets of TOE.
• Management Functions: TOE must provide functions that enforce proper management for itself. We must describe security objectives for assumptions (we have omitted it this time).
We show the relations between threats listed in 3.2 and the security objectives from 3.3 in Table 1 . Security documents must explain how the security objectives can oppose the threats with certainty in plain language.
To Select Security Functional Requirements that Achieve the Security Objectives
In ISO/IEC 15408, about 150 detailed functional requirements such as authentication, encryption and access control are defined beforehand. It is recommended that we select the security functional requirements that realize the security objectives from the defined functional requirements. Among those functional requirements, we have chosen 24 functional requirements that achieve the six security objectives described in 3.3.
We show the relations between the security objectives described in 3.3 and the security functional requirements described in 3.4 in Table 2 . In security documents, we must explain that security functional requirements can achieve the security objectives with certainty in plain language. Table 2 , we can show that the remote maintenance system for NPPs can oppose the five threats shown in (2) , and the assets shown in (1) can be protected.
ISO/IEC 15408 is made on the principle that necessary and sufficient assurance of security is essential, and that more than sufficient assurance is not good because of its heavy load on products or systems. By designing security based on ISO/IEC 15408, we can understand the necessary and sufficient conditions to oppose the threats. The security provided by the remote maintenance system for NPPs shown in Fig. 1 is necessary and sufficient against intrusion, impersonation, tapping, obstruction and destruction.
CONCLUSION
To give assurance of the security of remote maintenance systems for NPPs coherently and consistently, we have listed assets to be protected, threats to the assets, security objectives against the threats, and security functional requirements that achieve the security objectives. We have also shown the relations between the threats and the security objectives, and the relations between the security objectives and the security functional requirements. As a result, we have concretized a necessary and sufficient security design of a remote maintenance system for NPPs that can protect the I&C system against intrusion, impersonation, tapping, obstruction and destruction.
